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• Background/agenda
• Context – taxonomy of infrastructure industries
• Motivation
• Some preliminaries
• Brief tour of the theory on industry structure, competition and 
investment:
– Others’
– My own – highlighting the role of forward markets, and “welfare”
• Key lessons, and some tentative NZ applications
Outline
Background
• With Seini O’Connor, just had a book chapter 
published – “Comparison of long-term contracts 
and vertical integration in decentralised electricity 
markets”  retail competition can hurt investment
• On a mission to formalise the analysis, and to 
extend it to other infrastructure industries with 
some Toulouse School of Economics flavours
• 2010 Masters research made a start:
Vertical integration vs vertical separation in an 
imperfectly competitive industry, such as electricity, 
with retail, wholesale and forward markets
• Tonight’s seminar is a further instalment, based on 
preliminary doctoral research to be defended in 
September, with an investment and welfare focus
• Consider an imperfectly competitive industry structure with:
– Upstream intermediate good production
– Downstream final good production utilising the intermediate good
– Often with some sort of network in between
• Assuming network side of things is separately owned
• Relevant examples:
– Electricity – upstream generation, downstream retailing
– Gas – upstream exploration/extraction/refining, downstream 
retailing
– Computers – upstream chips, downstream PCs/phones, etc
– Dairy? – Fonterra upstream, other processors downstream
• Not considering pure network industries where upstream 
network(s) connect to downstream retail firms (e.g. 
telecoms)  big area, ripe for future exploration
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Integrated firm “In between?”
Recap
No. upstream
1/monopoly
2/duopoly
1/monopoly
2/duopoly
No. downstream
2 downstream/
duopoly
No. integrated
No. integrated
0/full separation
1/asymmetric integration
2/full integration
0 or 1:
• Successive 
monopolies (separated 
or integrated)
• Upstream monopoly 
with downstream 
duopoly 
(separated or partly 
integrated)
PLUS (by design, or strategy): 
• Wholesale market or not?
• Forward market or not?
• So, if you are a regulator, competition authority or 
reformer, which industry configuration is “best”?
– Is vertical integration between intermediate and final 
producers preferable to separation, and does it need to be full 
integration?
– Is it worth having a forward market in addition to a 
“spot”/wholesale market?
– Do we gain by moving from monopoly to (more) competition?
– How do these features interact strategically?
• My focus – economic “welfare” (consumer surplus + 
industry profits), and given its importance, 
“investment”:
– Capacity
– Cost-reduction/efficiency
– Also – quality, innovation/R&D, ...
Motivation
• Vertical coordination – how to ensure firms at one 
industry stage account for their decisions’ impacts 
on firms in the other stage:
– Famous result – vertically integrating successive 
monopolies removes “double marginalisation”  prices 
fall, output and profit rise: everybody wins!
– Integration is not always required for this – certain 
pricing regimes (e.g. RPM), or legal unbundling, can 
achieve the same outcome
• Horizontal coordination – how to ensure firms at the 
same industry stage account for their decisions’ 
impacts on each other:
– E.g. security of supply in electricity, contagion in banking
– Monopoly can beat competition on this score!
Some preliminaries
• Anticompetitive strategies? – vertically integrated 
firms can:
– Foreclose rivals – e.g. not supply rival downstream firms 
in wholesale (or forward) markets
– Raise rivals’ costs strategy (“RRC”) – i.e. buy on 
wholesale markets to drive up rivals’ input price
• Forward markets:
– Can make intermediate producers compete more 
aggressively in wholesale markets (“Allaz and Vila 1993 
effect”)  commitment problem/prisoner’s dilemma
– Enable separated downstream firms to offset  RRC by 
buying forward and then selling wholesale (Meade 
2010, over-buy and recycle strategy, “OBR”)
Preliminaries (cont’d)
• Consider an industry in which just one firm invests (e.g. in cost 
reduction), then two firms compete in final production
• Well-known investment strategies flow from the nature of market 
competition, and how investment by one firm affects the other’s 
profits
• Firms can compete in:
– Quantities – the more I sell, the less you can (strategic substitutes)
– Prices – if I raise my price then you can too (strategic complements)
• E.g. if investment hurts other firm’s profits, and firms compete in:
– Quantities – firm over-invests (“top dog” strategy)
– Prices – firm under-invests to not trigger aggressive competition 
(“puppy dog” strategy), or deters entry altogether by over-investing 
(“top dog” again)
Preliminaries (cont’d)
• In general, monopoly leads to lowest investment and welfare compared 
to either “first best”, or duopoly, even under vertical integration
• Monopolist wants to restrict output and raise price, so it also restricts 
investment (setting aside entry deterrence considerations)
• Integrated monopolist forecloses downstream rivals – forward and 
wholesale – though welfare and investment are still higher than under 
separation with two downstream firms  avoiding double marginalisation 
can matter more than downstream competition
• Exceptions:
– Monopoly can invest more than duopoly when duopolists invest sequentially, 
though welfare still lower (Boom 2002)
– Monopoly welfare can exceed duopoly welfare despite lower monopoly 
investment (Boom 2004, Boom and Buehler 2005)
 Monopolist better internalises risk of profit loss due to inadequate 
investment when blackouts are possible
 integrated duopolists reduce risk of gouging by rivals in wholesale 
market by increasing retail prices to constrain demand
A brief tour of the theory – Monopoly
• In general, duopoly outperforms monopoly in terms of investment and 
welfare (see previous exceptions), but still falls short of “first best”
• Furthermore, commonly, duopoly welfare and investment are ranked:
Full integration > Asymmetric integration > Full separation
• Full integration involves total foreclosure of downstream rivals –
wholesale and forward – but benefits of improved vertical coordination 
outweigh loss of “competition” (contrast full separation)
• Asymmetric integration balances costs of partial foreclosure or RRC 
against the vertical coordination benefits of partial integration, with the 
latter prevailing
• Exception – full separation can involve higher welfare with lower prices 
and investment than full integration when producers face blackout risk 
(Boom 2004, Boom and Buehler 2005)  separated firms still invest 
more than monopoly to avoid blackouts, but don’t directly boost prices to 
choke off demand
A brief tour of the theory – Duopoly
• VI leads to more downstream, cost-reducing investment (Buehler 
and Schmutzler 2008):
– “Top dog” strategy of VI firm in asymmetric case, harming its 
downstream rival
– Rival’s investment reinforces the VI firm’s RRC, boosting demand 
and hence wholesale price
• VI leads to more upstream, cost-reducing investment, and higher 
welfare (Meade 2011):
– VI firm’s higher investment in asymmetric case reduces upstream 
purchases, undermining its own RRC, helping its downstream rival
– Adding a forward market reinforces this effect by constraining 
wholesale prices (asymmetric integration and full separation cases 
only)  VI firm’s investment and rival’s OBR are complementary
• Full integration with foreclosure eliminates RRC altogether (so 
OBR not needed, and Allaz and Vila effect irrelevant)
Brief tour – Duopoly (cont’d)
Brief tour – Meade 2011
RRC worsens with forwards … … but forwards enable OBR
Brief tour – Meade 2011 (cont’d)
Forwards boost integrated 
firm’s investment …
… but reduce separated firm’s 
investment
Brief tour – Meade 2011 (cont’d)
Forwards boost separated 
downstream firm’s profit …
… but reduce separated 
upstream firm’s profit …
… with integrated firm and industry 
profits largely unchanged
Brief tour – Meade 2011 (cont’d)
Unless capital costs are very 
low, full integration provides 
higher welfare than asymmetric 
integration …
… but asymmetric integration 
always beats full separation
• Long been thought that competition might hinder innovation – e.g. 
Schumpeter  leaves insufficient profits for investment, and instead 
firm’s innovate to capture market/escape competition
• More recent work (e.g. Aghion et al. 2005) reveals subtle trade-offs 
between pre- and post-innovation rents, which vary depending on the 
level of competition  “inverted-U” shaped relationship between 
competition and innovation
• Early electricity sector research highlighted how competitive pricing can 
lead to under-investment (Von der Fehr and Harbord 1997)
• More recent electricity work highlights trade-off between benefits of 
competition and decreased supply security  horizontal coordination 
worsens with extra competition, increasing blackout risk (Janssen et al. 
2010, cf Boom 2004, and Boom and Buehler 2005)
• Growing body of electricity research argues that “hit and run” 
downstream competition can prejudice upstream investment – especially 
under vertical separation (e.g. Meade and O’Connor 2011)
More on competition and investment
• Welfare and investment don’t always move together
• Benefits of vertical coordination can be so strong as to offset 
costs of anti-competitive behaviours  VI good, more VI better
• Desirable attributes of competition must be weighed against its 
disadvantages, such as reduced horizontal coordination 
Competition good, but sometimes less competition is better
• Similarly, horizontal coordination issues can favour VS over VI
• Forward markets can complement other desirable industry 
features such as VI, and provide potentially powerful counter-
measures to firms exposed to anti-competitive behaviours
• Nature of competition, location of investment, industry structure, 
and competition combine to affect investment strategy
Key lessons
• Electricity:
– Smart metering should reduce blackout risks and hence 
need for horizontal coordination  favours VI over VS
– Forcing generators to sell forward substitutes benefits of 
forward trading for benefits of VI  net result = ?
– Will increased retail switching hurt investment and 
supply security?
• Dairy – tolerating VI might be best even though 
Fonterra can squeeze rivals?
• UFB (taking a deep breath):
– At what point will improved retail competition conflict 
with the need for horizontal coordination?
– Will separating Telecom improve investment and 
welfare?
Some NZ applications
Thank you – any questions?
